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Abstract
Cloud Computing has evolved as a new paradigm in which users can use on-demand
services, according to their needs. However, security concerns are primary obstacles to
a wider adoption of clouds. Newly born concepts that clouds introduced, such as multi-
tenancy, resource sharing and outsourcing, create new challenges for the security research.
DDoS (Distributed Denial of service) attack is the biggest threat to the cloud since it
affects the availability of services. There are a lot of techniques proposed by various
researchers to prevent DDoS attacks on a cloud infrastructure. We are using a Shuffling
Based approach for preventing DDoS in the cloud environment. This approach is reactive
and uses the resource elasticity of the cloud. The aim of this technique is to save the
maximum number of benign clients from the attack through shuffling. For assignment
of clients to the replica servers, we are using a greedy algorithm. Every time we call
this algorithm, we estimate the number of malicious clients using a proposed random
function for that round of shuffle. We have shown that we can save a desired percentage
of benign clients from the ongoing attacks after some shuffles. To detect the attack on each
server, a detector is deployed that uses an entropy-based approach for detecting DDoS.
A significant deviation in entropy represents the DDoS attack. We have also performed
some tests to select the suitable attributes for entropy-based DDoS detection in different
type of DDoS attacks. So in our work we have worked on both detection and prevention
of DDoS on cloud infrastructure.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
This chapter describes the overview of the thesis. It covers cloud computing, security
issues in cloud computing and distributed denial of service attack (DDoS) which are the
pillars of this thesis.
1.1 Cloud Computing
Cloud computing is one of the emerging area in the information technology field. Cloud
providers provide on demand services to customers over the internet and charge them
according to their usage. Cloud computing shares distributed resources over the network.
Cloud uses technologies like virtualization, multi-tenancy for its operation. Users enjoy
the services on the cloud without the headache of knowing the background technology and
controlling it. Cost effectiveness is the primary benefit of the adoption of cloud. NIST
(National Institute of Standards and Technology) defines cloud computing as [10] —
“Cloud Computing enables ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared
pool of configurable computing resources (e.g. Networks, servers, storage, applications,
and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management
effort or service provider interaction”
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Cloud computing have five essential characteristics-
1. On-demand self-service-
In cloud computing, a customer can get all the required services without require-
ment of any human interaction with the cloud service provider.
2. Ubiquitous network Access-
All the services are available over the network and can be accessed through standard
mechanisms over heterogeneous platforms, for example, computers, tablets, mobile
phones. High- Bandwidth connections must be available to connect cloud services.
3. Resource Pooling-
Resources of cloud service providers are pooled to serve multiple consumers using
a multi-tenant model, in which resources are dynamically assigned to the different
customers according to their usage. Service providers must have enough number of
resources to meet customer’s need. The resources can be placed at many geograph-
ical locations and assigned as virtual components of computation as required.
4. Rapid Elasticity-
Capabilities can be dynamically allocated and released. According to the need of
the customer, services are assigned to them automatically. Whenever demand in-
creases more number of resources assigned to serve the client. The consumer sees
it as an unlimited pool of resources.
5. Measured Services-
Services that are used by the customers are measured by providers. Resource usage
is monitored, and a report is sent to both of the parties involved. It makes the
charging system more transparent and accessible.
Cloud Services can be classified under three service models-
1. Software as a Service(SaaS)-
In this model, a subscriber can use a software that is running on Cloud Infrastruc-
ture. Applications are accessible from client resources such as web browsers. Ap-
plications are hosted on the service provider’s platform. In this model, consumers
4
1.1. CLOUD COMPUTING
do not have direct control over the underlying infrastructure like networks, servers,
operating systems. Pay-per-use and subscription agreement model can be used for
billing SaaS customers. True SaaS provides multi-tenant application infrastructure.
2. Platform as a Service(PaaS)-
In this service model subscribers can deploy their applications on the cloud envi-
ronment without installing tools on their machines. It provides operating system
support and software development tools to users. Using PaaS, developers can cre-
ate their applications without installing software building tools. The consumer does
not have control over networks, servers, operating systems and storage but have
control over application deployment. PaaS can provide complete development cy-
cle and development resources to developers, so it is very beneficial for entry level
developers. PaaS vendors are less because their target users are less in compari-
son to SaaS, but some of the SaaS vendors start offering PaaS services as a logical
extension of their services for example-Amazon Web Services.
3. Infrastructure as a Service(IaaS)-
This model shows the complete difference between traditional IT model and cloud
computing. In this model, customers are provided with essential resources like
processing, storage, networks. Customers can deploy their operating systems and
applications on virtual machines equipped with these resources. The consumer has
full control over operating systems, storage, deployed applications. IT organiza-
tions, having high expenses of purchasing dedicated hardware. Employing IaaS
provide scalability, resource elasticity, and maintenance better than the typical IT
infrastructure.
There are four types of delivery models present in the cloud-
1. Public Cloud-
This Cloud Model exists ‘Externally’ with very few restrictions for public use. It
means this infrastructure is available for public use across the world on the basis of
‘pay to use’; this ‘public’ can be individuals, corporations, academic organizations
or government agencies. Public Cloud infrastructure exists on the premise of cloud
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service provider. Shared Infrastructure, dynamic licensing and remote hosting are
features of public cloud infrastructure. Amazon web services, Google App Engine,
Microsoft Windows Azure are the examples of public clouds. This infrastructure
is very suitable for small scale organizations. Security is a primary concern in
public cloud adoption as many rival organizations may use it at the same time.
Their data kept on the same servers so, sometimes malicious users may harm the
data of others by using some tricks. Depending upon the needs of organization
configuration requirements, SLAs can be customized.
2. Private Cloud-
This Cloud Model explicitly builds for a single organization. They are also referred
as ‘internal Clouds’ as in most of the cases they exist on the premise of the user.
But, in some instances it can be off-premise too. The private cloud typically hosted
within the customer’s organization. Unlike public cloud infrastructure is not shared
among users in a private cloud. Security is considered to be more up to date. In pri-
vate cloud infrastructure is owned by the organization, so it has full control on how
applications are deployed on it. Private Cloud also considers being more flexible
and easily extensible for the future upgrades.
3. Community Cloud-
This Cloud model is created for a specific community of organizations having same
interests like security,implementation,compliance and policy. It may be owned by
one or more organizations or a third party. It may exist On premise or Off premise.
4. Hybrid Cloud-
Simply Hybrid Cloud is combination of Public/Private Cloud models. NIST defines
it as [10]-“A composition of two or more clouds(private, community or public) that
remain unique entities, but are bound together by standardized or proprietary tech-
nology that enables data and application portability (e.g. cloud bursting for load
balancing between cloud)”. A typical example of a hybrid cloud is an organization
that is running non-critical applications on a public cloud and critical applications
on private cloud infrastructure. An important feature of Hybrid Cloud is “Cloud-
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burst”. Cloudburst generally refers to a dynamic deployment model in which ap-
plication runs on the private cloud, which exist on premise, but as soon as demand
increase it can also be shifted to the public cloud outside premise of an organization.
1.2 Cloud Security
Even though there are many benefits of adoption of clouds, but there are many security
issues related to it.
Here we are classifying security issues under following categories- [15]
The Security Standards category covers security policies, security agreement between
clients and cloud service providers to ensure the required level of security in the
cloud. This category deals with auditing, service level agreements and other agree-
ments between two parties.
The Network category deals with the security of networks through which clients are
connected to the cloud. It covers request from the client’s browser, connection
establishment and cryptographic issues.
The Access Control category ensures that only authorized users get access rights on the
cloud resources. A proper identification and authorization mechanism need to be
set-up on the server side.
The Cloud Infrastructure category deals with all the threats to the infrastructure of the
cloud. It consists issues related to virtualization, IaaS, PaaS and SaaS. This category
also takes care of issues related to virtual machines also.
The Data category deals with data integrity and confidentiality issues with the customer’s
data on cloud environment.
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1.2.1 Known Attacks on Cloud Infrastructure
1. Denial of Services Attack-
This attack is on the availability of the cloud architecture. The majority of the at-
tacks in cloud computing are the denial of service attacks (DoS); these are flooding
attacks which floods the target server with unnecessary packets. DDoS attack is an
extension of the standard DoS attack in which many users across the globe floods
the server to make it unavailable for the legitimate clients. The cloud users ini-
tiate requests in XML, then send requests over HTTP protocol and usually build
their system interface through REST protocols for example Microsoft Azure and
Amazon EC2. DoS attacks are easier to implement and very difficult for security
personnel to countermeasure. An XML-based and HTTP-based DDoS attacks are
very common attacks on the cloud because the cloud operations heavily use these
protocols.
2. Theft of Service Attack-
The Theft of Service attack utilizes vulnerabilities of the scheduler of some hyper-
visors. In this attack scheduling mechanism used by the hypervisor fails to detect
usage of processing by some virtual machines. This allows malicious clients to use
services for the expenses of other clients. This attack is relevant to the public client
in which customers are charged according to the amount of time their virtual ma-
chine runs. In the theft of Service attack, the attacker makes sure that its process
never scheduled.
3. Malware Injection Attack-
In malware injection attack, attacker uploads a copy of the victim’s service instance
to the cloud, aiming some of the service requests of client process within that mali-
cious instance. By this attacker can get access over some of the client data. Critical
information leakage and unauthorized access are the primary motives of this attack.
The challenge is to find out the particular server on which attacker has uploaded the
manipulated copy of the victim’s malicious instance.
4. Phishing Attack-
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Phishing attacks are attempts for accessing critical information through some social
engineering technique. The attacker sends a link to web pages or instant messages
to the victim who appears to be genuine, leading to legitimate sites like bank login
page but take the victim to the fake locations. Through this activity, attacker gets
login information of the victim. Hijacking of the accounts in the cloud by using
some social networking techniques is also a variant of phishing attack.
5. Botnet Attacks-
In stepping-stone attack, Attacker maliciously acquires access to many of the nodes
and installs attack tools on them. Attacker achieves their goals like spying, DoS
through these stepping stones. An attacker can also hide their locations and iden-
tities so that they never be traced. Stepping stones attack the cloud server concur-
rently this set of nodes called as botnets. In recent years, botnet attacks have been
reported in Amazon EC2, Google App Engine.
6. VM Rollback Attack-
The virtualization layer is most vulnerable to attack in a cloud environment. Hy-
pervisors can suspend any VM’s execution and take a snapshot of it. After some
time, it can reload that snapshot and resume the operation this feature is very useful
in fault tolerance and VM maintenance. On the other hand, this process also opens
doors for VM rollback attack. In this attack, an attacker runs the snapshot of the vic-
tim without the knowledge of the victim and clears the history after running it. This
attack is useful in running a Brute force attack to get login password in case some
restrictions on the number of attempts for example block the user after 3 incorrect
login attempts, the attacker will rollback VM to its initial state after each attempt.
It can also clear the counter and run the attack unless it gets the login password.
7. Cross VM Side-Channel Attacks-
Side channel attack requires attacker’s VM to be on the same physical server on
which client’s VM resides. Cache based side channel attacks are examples of this
type of attack. All virtual machines on the same physical server share resources like
cache. Using timing-based attack malicious VM can analyze which of the possible
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keys is utilized by the victim VM to encrypt its connections. Many researchers
proved that AES and DES keys could easily be guessed by using cache-based side
channel attacks. Timing channels are especially hard to detect since they leave no
traces.
8. Audio Steganography Attacks-
The audio steganography attack is an attack on the cloud storage systems. In this
attack, users hide their secret data in regular audio files. In this attack, users can
protect their secret files in the media files and send them which looked like regular
files.
1.3 Distributed Denial of Service Attacks
Distributed Denial of service attack possesses the biggest threat to Internet services. The
attacker creates a botnet of the internet connected computers(each of them has been mali-
ciously taken over through malware like Trojan horses) and attack through them, so it is a
hard to locate attackers and block them. This makes research to detect and mitigate DDoS
more attractive. Attackers are finding new techniques to perform attacks day by day so
as researchers are using new ideas to counter them.The architecture of DDoS is shown in
Fig.1.1.
1.3.1 Types of DDoS
We can classify DDoS under following categories-
1. TCP-SYN flood attack-
This class of DDoS attack represents 90% DDoS attacks. This attack exploits the
vulnerability of TCP connection establishment. A TCP connection always starts
with a three way handshake between clients and server. In the first phase, an empty
TCP packet is sent by the client with a SYN flag raised. This packet asks the server
to open a new connection and allocate resources for the client. In the second phase,
the server sends an acknowledgment to the client along with SYN+ACK flag raised,
and in third phase client sends an ACK to the server with the ACK flag raised. In
10
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Figure 1.1: DDoS Attack
SYN flood attack, the attacker exploits this mechanism by quickly opening new
connections to a remote server until the maximum number of open connections to
that server is reached. In this situation, the legitimate clients are no longer able
to open any new connections. This scenario makes the server unavailable for le-
gitimate clients. In other words, SYN flooding occurs when the attacker sends an
enormous amount of packets to the server, but does not complete the process of
the three-way handshake. Then the server waits to complete the process. If no
ACK packet is received by the server within a specified time duration, connection
will be timed out and server will release the allocated resources since SYN packets
are flooded so every time server waste lot of resources for these fake connections.
Now a day, attackers send these SYN packets from spoofed IP addresses. Thus, the
server is unable to reply these requests, which keeps resources busy.
2. UDP flood attack-
In UDP Connections hosts need not establish a valid connection to the server (no
need of handshaking, like TCP) so a massive volume of traffic can be sent over
UDP channels to any server. This means that UDP floods are highly effective and
could be executed with fewer resources. In this type of attack attacker sends large
number of UDP Packets to random ports on server machine usually from spoofed
11
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IP addresses. The server checks whether any application is listening on these ports
or not. If not, then it replies to ICMP Destination Unreachable packets. In case
of flooding server needs to send a lot of ICMP Destination Unreachable packets
which consumes server’s resources and make it unavailable for legitimate users. A
variant of the UDP flood attack is Fraggle attack that is similar to Smurf attack, the
difference is that the attacker sends UDP traffic to port 7 (echo) and 19(chargen) to
an IP broadcast address with victim’s spoofed IP address.
3. Smurf attack-
In Smurf attack (ICMP flooding attack), the attacker spoofs the IP address of the
victim and sends a large number of ICMP echo request packets to the broadcast
address of his network. When hosts on this network receive that ICMP echo request
packets they reply victim with ICMP echo reply packets, which floods the victim
(server) and make it unavailable for legitimate users.
4. HTTP flooding attack-
HTTP flooding attack is a high rate flooding attack on the application layer of the
TCP/IP stack. In this type of attack, the attacker sends a large number of legitimate
type HTTP requests(basically GET and POST) to the target server requesting web-
pages, files. The server starts to serve these requests and waste lot of resources for
them (processing and memory) and unable to serve the request of actual legitimate
clients.
1.4 Motivation
From the above section, it is clear that DDoS is biggest threat for any internet technology
that also includes cloud environments. A research estimated that the average cost of one
minute of downtime due to a DDoS attack is $22,000. Since, most of the organizations
are moving to the cloud, security of cloud environment is a significant concern. During
studies related to attacks on the cloud, we found DDoS handling is very crucial for proper
operation of the cloud. So we have decided to work in this field. Primary motive of DDoS
attacker is to affect availability of services, if somehow we can maintain a required level
12
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of services for innocent customers our motive of mitigating the effect of DDoS is fulfilled.
1.5 Contributions
Our work is about DDoS detection and prevention in cloud environment.
• Modification in greedy algorithm for client assignment in shuffling based approach.
• Proposed a random function for estimation of malicious clients which is used by
greedy algorithm.
• Incorporated detection and shuffling based prevention techniques for cloud envi-
ronment.
• Proper selection of attributes for entropy based detection of DDoS in case of differ-
ent types of DDoS attack is explained.
1.6 Organization of Thesis
The rest of thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2:This chapter describes about DDoS detection strategy.
Chapter 3:This chapter explains about Shuffling based mechanism for DDoS preven-
tion on cloud.
Chapter 4:This chapter elaborates simulation result and implementation.
Chapter 5:This chapter describes conclusions and future work.
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CHAPTER 2
Detection of DDoS Attack
Detection of distributed denial of service attack is extremely important part of DDoS han-
dling. This chapter explains about various strategies proposed earlier for DDoS detection.
We have used entropy-based detection that is explained deeply in this chapter.
2.1 Literature Review
Since the evolution of DDoS attacks different type of detection mechanism being pro-
posed. Cabrera et al. [5] used network management systems that use MIB (Management
Information Base) variables to detect precursors of attack, change in these MIB variables
during attack used as a technique to detect attacks. This method was statistical in na-
ture. Jeong et al. [11] stated that during denial of service attack very few IP addresses
appear which are very less in comparison to the appearance during flash events they also
compared these two events on various parameters. Lee et al. [16] proposed a unique path
fingerprint scheme that represents the route of the IP packet has traversed. For each client,
they create an entry for corresponding fingerprint if a spoofed packet is coming from some
other route it has been discarded. Liao et al. [18] used a K- nearest neighbor classifier to
classify patterns into normal or intrusive classes. They have tested with the 1998 DARPA
BSM dataset. Gavrillis et al. [9] presented an approach using radial basis function neural
network detector for DDoS attacks. A small number of statistical descriptors were used
to distribute behavior of DDoS and classification is achieved using RBF-NN. We have
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analyzed entropy-based approach to detect DDoS. Many authors have worked previously
on entropy based approach to detect DDoS. [4], [13], [17], [23]
2.2 Entropy Based Detection
Entropy is a well-known and valuable concept in information theory. It is the measure
of uncertainty associated with a random variable and describes the degree of dispersal or
concentration of a distribution. It was introduced by Claude E. Shannon in ”A Mathe-
matical Theory of communication”, 1948. Entropy can be well utilized in the detection
of DDoS because after analyzing DDoS attacks, researchers examined that Higher Vol-
ume of traffic, incomplete Connections and flooding of packets are characteristics of the
attack. Therefore, entropy could be used to calculate the distribution randomness of the
packet attributes. These attributes could be Source IP, Destination IP, Source Port, Desti-
nation Port, Length, Protocol, Flags. We can check the entropy of all useful attributes of
the packet. If entropy is high, it means distribution is random. Entropy is calculated by
examining a series of packets, refer as the window. If a window consists N packets, then
entropy could vary from 0 to log N. Entropy is zero when all the values of the distribu-
tion are same, it is highest when all the values are different. If there are N elements in a
window, then Entropy of random variable X is defined as H(X),where a random variable
X is taking values from x1, x2, x3....xN and probability of occurrence of these values are
p1, p2, p3. . . . . . pN respectively.
H(X) =
N∑
i=1
pilog2pi (2.1)
where pi = (number of times X having value xi)/(size of the window )
Under normal network conditions, the entropy value of the particular attribute may
deviate up to some extent, but in case of DDoS attack, it will have remarkable fluctua-
tions. Normalized entropy value can be used in order to set the threshold and raising an
alert. Normalized entropy is used to find out the overall probability distribution in packet
window W.
Normalized entropy = H(X) / log2N0
Where N0 is the number of distinct X values in the given window, H(X) is the entropy
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of X in window W. If Normalized Entropy< Threshold value, mark window as suspected.
An alert can be raised if we get some continuous suspected windows.
2.3 Selection of Attributes for the Entropy Based Detec-
tion of DDoS
The effect on the entropy of all the useful packet attributes during DDoS attack is analyzed
and their usefulness is also tested against famous types of distributed denial of service
attack. During analysis, the proper choice of attributes one should make to get a better
threshold is explained.
DDoS attack may affect entropy values of different network attributes. These values
vary from different types of DDoS attack. Experiments were performed on the differ-
ent types of DDoS attack and usefulness of various packet attributes for entropy based
detection is analyzed. For experiments, NUST datasets for TCP-SYN flood, UDP flood
and Smurf attacks [3] were used. Attack and non-attacked packets are marked in this
dataset. We have preprocessed the dataset and took 100000 non attack packets from each
dataset(TCP-SYN flood, UDP flood and Smurf attacks dataset). In that, 10,000 attack
packets from packet count 10000 to 20000 were mixed. We have examined entropy val-
ues for all significant attributes of the packet header. Major categories of DDoS attacks
and effect on entropy of different attributes is explained below-
2.3.1 TCP-SYN Flood Attack
TCP-SYN flood attack exploits the weakness of TCP connection establishment. On the
entropy values of every important attribute of packet header, we analyzed the effect of
DDoS.
1. Source IP and Destination IP address Entropy
In case of TCP-SYN flood attack attacker may use a random population of spoofed
IP addresses. So, there may be cases where the entropy of Source IP can’t be too
effective for detecting TCP-SYN flooding. From Fig.2.1, it is clear that we can’t
set a proper threshold when the source IP population is random. Destination IP of
these TCP-SYN attack packets are normally the victim’s IP; all the spoofed Source
17
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Figure 2.1: Source IP entropy during TCP-SYN attack
Figure 2.2: Destination IP entropy during TCP-SYN attack
IP packets have the victim’s IP as their destination IP. Hence, we get repetition in
this field values. Because of this entropy typically decrease during the attacks as
shown in Fig.2.2.
2. Source Port and Destination Port Entropy
In the current attack scenario, attackers use random source Port numbers in attack
packets. That is the main reason why the entropy of Source Port is not heavily
affected during the attack as in Fig.2.3. The scenario remains true for destination
Port entropy because attackers are intelligent enough to attack random ports on the
victim machine as in Fig.2.4, hence, no variations in entropy here. But, sometimes
it may be the case that they are targeting only few ports of victim machine that will
decrease the randomness of Destination Port values and decrease the entropy during
18
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Figure 2.3: Source port entropy during TCP-SYN attack
Figure 2.4: Destination port entropy during TCP-SYN attack
the attack as well.
3. Flag, Protocol and Length Entropy
In case of TCP-SYN attack packets only SYN flag raised. So, whenever attack
traffic floods, packets with only SYN flag raised shall flow in the network. This
will decrease the entropy of the flag field during attack scenario as in Fig.2.5. It is
obvious that TCP-SYN attack packets use the TCP protocol in the protocol field of
the header. During an attack, we get a large proportion of packets with protocol field
TCP, this will decrease the entropy of the protocol field during the attack shown in
Fig.2.6, But in most of the connections most of the packets use TCP protocol so
this measure may not be that useful in those cases. Length is a very useful metric
to judge entropy variations during the TCP - SYN attack. The main reason behind
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Figure 2.5: Flag field entropy during TCP-SYN attack
Figure 2.6: Protocol field entropy during TCP-SYN attack
that is normally attack packets have similar lengths [7]. When the length of packets
remains same, then entropy decreases as shown in Fig.2.7.
2.3.2 Smurf Attack
Smurf attack uses ICMP icho reply packets to attack a server. Characteristics of attributes
during smurf attack are explained.
1. Source IP and Destination IP address Entropy
In case of smurf attack, Source IP addresses or IP addresses of hosts whom the
attacker sends the ICMP echo request messages. The number of hosts may vary
depend upon the size of the attacker’s network. In our case, we are getting deviation
in entropy of Source IP addresses it means Source IP addresses are repeated during
20
2.3. SELECTION OF ATTRIBUTES FOR THE ENTROPY BASED DETECTION OF
DDOS
Figure 2.7: Length field entropy during TCP-SYN attack
Figure 2.8: Source IP entropy during Smurf Attack
the attack as shown in Fig.2.8. We are getting this useful deviation because in
case of smurf attack the attacker has not generated Source IPs randomly. Every
host in the attacker’s network will send the ICMP echo reply to Victim (server),
so destination IP will remain same in all the attack packets that will decrease the
entropy of the Destination IP field shown in Fig.2.9.
2. Length and Protocol Field Entropy
As we said earlier in this section, attack packets usually have the similar size so
the entropy of length field will show deviation during the attack shown in Fig.2.10.
Since ICMP flood packets use the ICMP protocol, so when we plotted entropy of
Protocol field in Fig.2.11 during the attack it was zero because all attack packets
are having the same protocol(ICMP)
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Figure 2.9: Destination IP entropy during Smurf Attack
Figure 2.10: Length field entropy during Smurf Attack
smurf attacks use ICMP packets that do not have port numbers, Flag fields.
2.3.3 UDP Flood Attack
UDP flood attack is easiest DDoS attack to perform. It targets ports of server randomly
so that server wastes its resources in sending ICMP destination unreachable messages.
1. Source IP and Destination IP address Entropy-
Source IP again spoofed, so an attacker chooses some random Source IPs, but some-
times it chooses from a limited pool that will decrease the entropy of Source IPs dur-
ing the attack as in Fig.2.12. Every bot targets a single or less number of servers that
reduce the entropy of destination address during the attack as shown in Fig.2.13.
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Figure 2.11: Protocol field entropy during Smurf Attack
Figure 2.12: Source IP entropy during UDP Flood Attack
Figure 2.13: Destination IP entropy during UDP Flood Attack
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Figure 2.14: Length field entropy during UDP Flood Attack
Figure 2.15: Protocol field entropy during UDP Flood Attack
2. Flag, Length and Protocol Entropy
Again the scenario is same as TCP-SYN flood, here attacker uses UDP protocol so
flags field will not be used. As we explained the earlier size of UDP attack packets
also remains similar during the attack, which considerably decrease entropy values
of length shown in Fig.2.14. As the name suggests, UDP flood packets use UDP
protocol, so this repetition of protocol decreases the entropy of the protocol field
clearly shown in Fig.2.15.
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Figure 2.16: Source port entropy during UDP Flood Attack
Figure 2.17: Destination port entropy during UDP Flood Attack
3. Source Port and Destination Port Entropy
As discussed earlier in this section, Source port of attack packets are usually random
these days hence, not a big deviation during the attack as shown in Fig.2.16. In case
of destination port attacker first check which ports are open on the server side. Then
the attacker targets only those ports that are open to disturb the service given by the
server. Since attacker attacks all the open ports randomly, therefore, this hardly
affects entropy of destination ports as shown in Fig.2.17.
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2.4 Summary
In this chapter, we dealt with DDoS detection problem. An entropy-based approach is
explained which we have incorporated with the shuffling-based prevention mechanism
explained in next chapter. We have examined different packet attributes against all famous
types of DDoS attack for entropy based detection. Attributes like destination IP, protocol,
length provide better threshold for all type of DDoS attacks.
26
Chapter 3
Prevention of DDoS Attack
Literature Review
Shuffling Based Technique
Summary
CHAPTER 3
Prevention of DDoS Attack
This chapter elaborates about prevention of DDoS on cloud environment. After explaining
different types of techniques used by researchers so far, we have chosen shuffling-based
approach for DDoS prevention. Entropy-based detection has been incorporated with the
prevention model. A greedy algorithm for client assignment is explained in the chapter
along with necessary assumptions.
3.1 Literature Review
A number of mechanisms proposed in the last few years to mitigate DDoS can be grouped
under various approaches.
1. Filtering-based Defense-
For stopping DDoS attack traffic, filtering-based defenses deploy packet filters on
Internet core and edge routers. Aim of these filters is to block clients with spoofed
IP addresses, hosts emitting excessive traffic, or flows deemed as malicious by their
receivers. Ingress filtering [8] was proposed to validate the source address of each
packet at its network entry point. These filters only allows traffic from a limited
range of IP addresses. Although ingress filtering helps individual ISPs to regu-
late Internet users and prevent network misuse, this mechanism has not received
wide enough adoption to eradicate IP spoofing. Attackers now a days use to cre-
ate large botnets and attack without spoofing IP addresses. For mitigating flooding
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attacks with or without IP spoofing Mahajan et. al [20] proposed Pushback to rate-
limit inordinate senders via aggregate-based congestion control. An aggregate is
a collection of packets sharing some common properties, such as address prefix,
application, or packet type. According to Pushback attack traffic can be classified
into different aggregates from legitimate traffic. Internet routers are expected to
identify and rate-limit all attacking aggregates in a collaborative manner. However,
differentiating well-masked attack traffic from legitimate traffic is a difficult job that
requires deep packet inspection, costing precious CPU cycles from the routers. Liu
et. al [19] deployed Stopit servers on the destination side that collect complaints
about malicious source nodes and tells Stopit servers on the source side to block
malicious flows locally. Each Stopit server manages one autonomous system (AS)
that is considered a fate-sharing unit.
2. Capability-based Defense
Filtering-based defense encounters attacker identification problems. In capacity-
based mechanism destination node decides whether a particular source node is al-
lowed or not. Destination node also sets the limit on the volume of traffic that can
be sent by a flow within a specified time window. Source nodes that violate the as-
signed capability will be considered malicious. In early work related to capability-
based mechanism, an Internet host that wants to send packets to another host must
first request the receiver’s approval. The source of a request to send is attested
by the forwarding routers. The approval from the destination node is issued in the
form of a flow-bound capability token that also defines the maximum throughput al-
lowed. Although only a small portion of the overall bandwidth is expected to carry
capability requests under normal conditions, some early solutions are vulnerable to
denial of capability (DoC) attacks. DoC attacks simply flood the capability request
channel to deny access to legitimate communications. Parno et. al [21] proposed
a proof-of-work (PoW) solution that guarantees per-computation fairness. Before
capability requests from a particular source can be delivered to the destination, the
source node must solve crypto-puzzles disseminated by well-provisioned services
(e.g. DNS) and attach the answers to the requests. Participating forwarding routers
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are responsible for verifying the answers and dropping all invalid requests. Enforc-
ing PoW will reduce attackers traffic rate and increase the chances that legitimated
capability requests are going to reach the desired destinations.
3. Overlay-based Defense
Secure overlay networks provide an network of proxy between clients and server.
Secure Overlay networks were proposed to provide authentication, filtering, indi-
rection, attack tracking and tolerance on top of the physical Internet infrastructure.
SOS [14] introduced a three-tier network design with doubly indirect routing to
assure DDoS resiliency. A small portion of all overlay nodes are employed to
form each tier. Incoming flows are forwarded to the beacon nodes after success-
ful authentication, and then routed to the secret servlets that eventually lead to the
protected server. Overlay nodes can join and exit the network at run time without
affecting the overall stability. It was robust against pure flooding attacks in that at-
tackers have to bombard a large number of overlay nodes to cause a service disrup-
tion. A spread-spectrum method [22] was proposed to encourage clients sending
duplicated packets to multiple overlay nodes to ensure a high packet delivery rate
during an attack. Same as SOS, Phalanx [6] recommended using a swarm of proxy
nodes to serve as mailboxes that bounce end-to-end traffic in the middle of the In-
ternet. The destination hosts are expected to actively contact the mailboxes to pick
up legitimate packets, leaving attack traffic to be filtered out. Overlay networks are
relatively static. Thus, the overlay itself may become a target of a flooding DDoS
attack.
4. Shuffling based Mechanism-
This approach was proposed by Jia et al. [12]. Cloud infrastructures are static and
homogeneous for ease of administration, so it leaves ample opportunity for attack-
ers to compromise them. To counter this in shuffling based approach, they shuffled
clients intelligently among servers to save maximum number of benign clients from
on-going attack by isolating them from malicious clients. By doing this targets
(servers) become dynamic, so it’s hard to follow them by attackers. This solution
may increase the cost for potential attackers by complicating the attack process to
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make the network more secure against naive and persistent attacks. We have also
adopted this technique for DDoS prevention with few modifications.
We have used the resource elasticity capability of the cloud for our defense mech-
anism. When the attack occurred, we instantiate new replica servers and clients
on the attacked servers are reassigned to new replica servers using an algorithm
that is discussed in the following sections. So, we are creating an environment that
will evade both types of malicious clients that is naı¨ve and intelligent. Naı¨ve ma-
licious clients will not able to follow the movement. Intelligent malicious clients
may follow the move, but we are using a greedy algorithm for assignment that will
maximize the number of innocent clients saved in each round of shuffle. It will try
to isolate benign clients from the malicious ones by shuffling. Our approach does
not use any authentication mechanism as used in [12], it provides internet services
to anonymous users.
3.2 Shuffling Based Techniques
This strategy is a reactive approach. We have created a mathematical model of the ap-
proach. Initially, we started with N number of clients. We have S replica servers on which
we will assign these customers. The number of replica servers will remain constant for
each shuffle. Initially, we assign N clients on S replica servers randomly. When an attack
occurs on some replica servers, we mark them and all the clients associated with these
servers are also marked. Every marked client is equally suspect to be malicious. We do
not disturb clients on non-attacked servers, so we instantiate new replica servers in place
of these non-attacked servers to make the number of replica servers constant. Clients on
attacked servers considered for the next shuffle. All the attacked replica servers are taken
offline and reused after recycling for the next shuffle. Now, we have a new value of N
that is the number of clients on attached servers. As we mentioned the number of replica
servers would remain constant, so we will use S replica servers for each shuffle. Now,
we will estimate the number of malicious clients that are M according to random estima-
tion function proposed in subsequent sections. By using a greedy shuffling algorithm, we
will assign these N clients on S replica servers. We will repeat the shuffling process until
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we save the desired number of innocent clients. The aim of this approach is to save the
maximum number of benign clients from ongoing DDoS attack because we do not want
harmless clients to be affected by the DDoS attack. We are also using a limit of clients on
each replica server which will maintain quality of services for each client. Since shuffling
is a stochastic process, we can only calculate the probability that a given replica server
is attacked or not. T is number of benign clients saved, by using that probability we can
derive E (T), the expected number of benign clients to be saved in one round. Therefore,
solving the following optimization problem will maximize the number of benign clients
to be saved.
E (T ) =
S∑
i=1
pixi =
∑S
i=1
 N − xi
M
xi N
M
 (3.1)
subject to
∑S
i=1 xi = N
where x1, x2...xi denotes no. of clients assign to each replica server S, pi denotes the
probability that ith replica is not under attack.
As explained in each shuffle, we instantiate new replica servers to make number of
replica servers constant.Hence we need a big pool of replica servers, initially we start
with enough number of replica servers so that they could serve all the clients effectively.
Shuffling process is stateless in order to reduce overhead.
3.2.1 Assumptions
The following assumptions were made during our work-
1. If a malicious client is associated to a replica server, it will always cause Distributed
denial of service attack on that server.
2. Every replica server has enough number of resources so that it can easily serve allo-
cated number of clients.
3. In each shuffle we are assuming a different set of malicious clients. Because it may be
the case that all malicious clients not attacking concurrently.
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Figure 3.1: Architecture of Cloud Environment
4. For web services redirection can be implemented by HTTP redirection code(3xx),or
run a snippet of redirection code inside client browsers.
5. Replica servers that are being attacked can be recycled after some time.
3.2.2 Architecture
The overall architecture of system is shown in Fig.3.1 is described below-
1. DNS Servers-
The DNS server will redirect the client to a cloud domain where the serving replica
is present. The DNS server contact to Coordination server which has a list of active
replicas, each replica has an IP address that will uniquely identify it. The client will
initially assign to any one of these replica servers decided by the load balancer.
2. Load Balancer-
Load balancer assigns new clients to an active replica server. Each client IP is only
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assigned to one replica server. In case of attack when shuffling starts, the load bal-
ancer will inform the replica server and client about the new assignment. This is
done by HTTP redirection code(3xx) the client redirection task is prioritized over
any other task, Client redirection traffic is also prioritized in the cloud environment.
At least one load balancer is installed in each cloud domain to keep track of assign-
ment of clients to servers. There can be more than one load balancer to ensure fault
tolerance.
3. Replica Servers-
Replica Servers are the main target for attackers. Each replica server has a unique IP
address. When there is no attack, a small number of replica servers are maintained
to serve the clients. When an attack happens, we instantiate new replica servers
in place of attack servers and reassignment process take place. Replica servers
perform whitelist-based filtering, only allow clients whose IPs are confirmed by the
load balancer.
4. Coordination Server-
Coordination Server is the central pillar of the whole system, it tracks the number of
clients associated with each server and marks the replicas that are under attack on
the basis of the information gathered from detectors. Based on number of attacked
replicas it estimates malicious clients and assign the affected clients on newly in-
stantiated replicas using an algorithm described in following sections.
5. DDoS Detectors-
On each replica server, a DDoS detector is also deployed. This detector moni-
tors all incoming traffic on that replica server and uses an entropy-based approach
explained in the previous chapter. As soon as detector analyzed deviation from
threshold it reports directly to Coordination server about the attack.
3.2.3 Greedy Algorithm for Assignment
A greedy algorithm is used for client assignment. This algorithm uses two more algo-
rithms MaxAssign, which is assigning clients to servers based on the probability function
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described earlier. The second algorithm is ShuffleNeeded, which is checking that whether
we have saved required number of clients if not then perform more shuffles. Before exe-
cuting actual algorithm, we are taking desired percentage of benign clients to be saved as
an input.
Algorithm 1: Greedy Algorithm
Data: Number of clients N, Number of malicious clients M, Number of servers S,
Limitation of clients on a server L
Global variables tac = 0, tas = 0;
if N ≤ S then
Assign a replica server for each client
Mark tac, tas in case of attack
if All clients are assigned to servers then
ShuffleNeeded()
else if S==1 then
Assign all clients to that server
if an attack happens then
We can’t save any clients
else
All clients are saved from attack.
Exit
else if M == 0 then
Evenly distribute clients to replica servers
Mark tac, tas in case of attack(because M=0 is just an estimation)
if All clients are assigned to servers then
ShuffleNeeded()
else
µ = MaxAssign(N, 0, N − 1,M,L)
Mark tac, tas in case of attack
if All clients are assigned to servers then
ShuffleNeeded()
RemN=N-µ
RemS=S-1
RemM=round (M ∗RemN)/N
Greedy(RemN, RemM, RemS,L)
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Algorithm 2: MaxAssign
Data: N,LB,UB,M,L
max=0,maxassign=0;
fi=Min(UB,L)
for i= LB to fi do
Save =
 N − xi
M
xi/
 N
M

if save>max then
max= Save
maxassign=i
return maxassign
Algorithm 3: ShuffleNeeded
Saved clients from attack till now = N - tac
if saved % of clients > desired percentage then
Process complete with sh shuffles
Exit
else
sh=sh+1
new N=tac
y = number of malicious clients in previous shuffle
new mal = random [tas, min(y,tac)]
tas=0
tac=0
Greedy(new N,new mal,S,L)
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Figure 3.2: Saving of all benign clients after two rounds of shuffle
The shuffling process is explained through a Fig.3.2. in which, we have taken 12
clients and 4 servers. Initially clients were assigned randomly. When attack happens on
server S2,S3 and S4 we mark all clients on these servers and reassign them on S5,S6,S7
and S8. Now, suppose S6,S7 were attacked. We will reassign all clients on these attacked
servers on server S9,S10,S11 and S12. If attack happens on S9 and S10 we do not initiate
any action because client 8 and 7 were only clients on these servers. So, they have caused
the attack and our motive is to isolate attackers from benign clients. Therefore, we have
saved all the clients after two shuffles.
3.2.4 Estimation of Malicious Clients
For estimating malicious clients among all clients, a random estimation approach is pro-
posed. Since,only number of servers being attacked and clients associated to these servers
is known to us. So, only a rough estimation of number of malicious clients can be made.
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For that following function is used:
Estimated number of malicious clients = Random [x, min (y, z)]
Where
x=Total affected servers
y= Estimated malicious clients in previous shuffle
z=Total clients on attacked servers
In the first round during the estimation of the total number of malicious clients above
function can not be used as value of the term ‘Estimated malicious clients in previous
shuffle’, is unknown to us. Therefore, following function is used for first time estimation:
Estimated number of malicious clients for first shuffle = Random [x,z]
But for ease of operation we are taking M as input to our greedy assignment algorithm
for the first time.
Note- If a single client is assigned to a replica server and that server is under attack it
means that the client is malicious so that client will be stopped from participating in
further shuffling because our aim is isolate benign clients from malicious ones.
3.3 Summary
Shuffling-based mechanism for DDoS prevention is discussed in this chapter. An archi-
tecture of cloud environment that includes both detection and prevention strategies also
explained. A greedy algorithm is also described for client assignment along with a ran-
dom estimation function. Implementation of this algorithm is described in next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
Simulation & Results
4.1 Simulation Environment
In this part, we evaluated the performance of the shuffling mechanism using a greedy
algorithm and proposed estimation function. MATLAB is used for simulation of the
greedy algorithm.
Entropy-based detection strategy was also implemented. For implementation of en-
tropy based technique ’CAIDA 2007 DDoS attack dataset’ is used as a attack dataset [2]
and ’CAIDA 2008 anonymized dataset’ is used as a normal traffic dataset [1]. By us-
ing Wireshark ’.pcap’(packet capture) files were converted into ’.csv’(comma seperated
values) files and then by using a Python script entropy of destination IP in the packet
windows of 100 and 1000 was calculated.
4.2 Simulation Analysis
Detection and prevention schemes for DDoS were simulated in different environments.
Analysis of the implementation work is explained below-
4.2.1 Detection Analysis
Entropy values of normal traffic in the windows of 100 and 1000 packets were plotted
as shown in Fig.4.1 and Fig.4.2 respectively. Attack packets were mixed with normal
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Figure 4.1: Entropy calculation in windows of 100
packets (from packet count 100000 to 200000) remaining packets were kept same. We
have seen a fluctuation of entropy values in the range of 100000-200000 packet count
where we mixed the attack packets as shown in Fig.4.3 and Fig.4.4. Entropy decreased in
this region, It represents that in this region distribution of Destination IPs are less random
than normal scenario.
4.2.2 Shuffling Process Analysis
This algorithm was checked for two scenarios-
1. Keeping number of clients fixed as 1000 and number of servers as 50, when we
tried to save 80% of benign clients a graph is plotted, each data point simulation was run
10 times to generate average data points.
By increasing number of insiders it is clear from the Fig.4.5 that number of shuffles
will also increase.
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Figure 4.2: Entropy calculation in windows of 1000
2. By keeping clients fixed as 1000 and number of insiders as 50 a second plot is
drawn to show relationship between number of servers and number of shuffles, when we
try to save 80% of benign clients.
It is clear from the Fig.4.6 that by increase in number of servers, number of shuffles
will decrease.
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Figure 4.3: Entropy calculation in windows of 100 when attack packet mixed
4.3 Summary
Simulation of entropy-based detection and shuffling-based prevention has explained in
this chapter. Entropy-based detection technique has been implemented using Wireshark
and python. The shuffling-based mechanism has been simulated using MATLAB. We
have shown that entropy of destination IP shows a remarkable deviation during the DDoS
attack that is helpful in detecting DDoS. For indicating the usefulness of the shuffling
approach, we implemented the relationship of malicious clients with number of shuffles,
replica servers with the number of shuffles that displays the performance of the algorithm
with changing criteria.
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Figure 4.4: Entropy calculation in windows of 1000 when attack packet mixed
Figure 4.5: Relationship between number malicious clients and shuffles
44
4.3. SUMMARY
Figure 4.6: Relationship between number of replica servers and shuffles
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Conclusion and Future Work
In this thesis, we have explained about DDoS detection and prevention model in the cloud
environment. A shuffling-based mechanism for DDoS prevention is used in which our aim
was to save maximum number of benign clients from ongoing attack through intelligent
shuffles of clients. For detection of attacks, an entropy-based technique is utilized. We
have analyzed that some attributes like packet size, destination IP and protocols can also
be utilized as an essential attribute in case of entropy-based detection that has not been
used by researchers earlier. Their usefulness for all the famous types of DDoS attacks is
explained through simulation. A model that incorporates both detection and prevention
mechanisms of DDoS is presented. A greedy algorithm is proposed for client assign-
ment that assigns clients intelligently on the replica servers that uses a proposed random
function for malicious client estimation. Through experiments, it is proved that desired
percentage of benign clients can be saved from the attack using this algorithm in few
shuffles. Since, shuffling based prevention method is new a lot of improvements can be
made in the future. During shuffles, migration of client sessions can also be addressed.
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